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INTRODUCTION
Gurdev Cheema i s a devout K halsa Sik h.

A

central tenet of the

Sik h fai th requi res Ms. Cheema and her t hree chi ldren to bear fi ve
symbols of thei r fai th at all ti mes: "k es" (long hai r) , a "k angha"
(comb), "k achch" (sacred underwear), a "k ara" (steel bracelet), and a
"ki rp an" (ceremoni alk ni fe ).1
*
Thanks to the Michigan Law Review Notes Office for their editorial assistance.
Thanks also to Professor James Boyd White of the Michigan Law School for his helpful
comments and ideas. An earlier version of this Note won the Alliance Defense Fund's
William Pew Religious Freedom Scholarship Competition.

1. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1995).

2209
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the Li vi ngston, Cali forni a school di stri ct bannedk ni ves -

ki rp ansi ncluded - from allp ubli c schools. Any student who fai led to
comp ly wi th the ban was threatened wi th exp ulsi on.2 Ms. Cheema's
three chi ldren were all enrolled i n Li vi ngston p ubli c schools at the
ti me, so Ms. Cheema faced three unattracti ve choi ces:

(1)

her chi ldren

could vi olate a central tenet of thei r reli gi on and attend school wi thout
thei rki rp ans; (2) her chi ldren could vi olate thei r school's i nstructi ons
and face exp ulsi on; or (3) she couldk eep her chi ldren at home and fi le
a lawsui t agai nst the school i n order to force the board to grant her
chi ldren an excep ti on.3 She chose the last op ti on.
Fortunately for Ms. Cheema, she eventuallyp revai ledi n court and
her chi ldren were p ermi tted to return to school wi th thei r ki rp ans. 4
Central to her success was the Reli gi ous Freedom Restorati on Act
(RFRA), whi ch mandated that state governments may not burden a
p erson's free exerci se of reli gi on unless the governmental acti on was
the least restri cti ve alternati ve and served a comp elli ngi nterest. 5 The
Sup reme Court subsequently struck down thep art of the RFRA that
app il ed to the states.6
Cases ilk e Ms. Cheema's are exp ected to become even more
common wi th thei nflux ofp rograms whi ch are ilk ely to offend certai n
fai ths, such as school uni forms7 and sexual health courses.8 Wi th thi s
p otenti al i ncrease i n di sp utes there has been a decrease i n j udi ci al
clari ty on how to handle such cases.9 The reason for the murki ness has
much to do wi th a rapi d reconfi gurati on of the Fi rst Amendment's

2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 48915(a)(2) (West 2003) (requiring a recommendation of
expulsion for the possession of a knife of no reasonable purpose to the pupil).
3. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 884-85.
4. Id. at 886.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l (2000). The RFRA stated:
(a) In general: Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section. (b} Exception: Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
-

Id.
6. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the RFRA because
Congress overstepped its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
7. See Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (E.D.N.C. 1999). In
Hicks, a custodial great-grandmother objected to the School Board's uniform policy on
religious grounds because she claimed the policy eliminated all free will and was required by
the anti-Christ. Id.
8. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 193 F. Supp. 491, 497 (D. Conn. 2002).
9. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999)
(discussing confusion), rev'd en bane, 220 F.3d 1 134 (2000).
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i fteen years and
Free Exerci se Clause1 0 juri sp rudence over the p ast f
corresp ondi ng jousti ng between the Sup reme Court and Congress.
From 1963 through 1990, the Sup reme Court emp loyed what was
termed a "stri ct scruti ny" test for free exerci se challenges.11 The Court,

Employment Division Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
1990 and rep lacedi t wi th a much less restri cti ve
one.1 2 I n Smith, the Court confronted the questi on of whether

in

abandoned thi s testi n

Oregon's cri mi nal law agai nstp eyote use was consti tuti onal as app il ed
to members of the Nati ve Ameri can Church who smok ed p eyote for
reli gi ous p urp oses.1 3 The Court found that the law was consti tuti onal
and held that the Free Exerci se Clause does not reli eve i ndi vi duals of
the obli gati on to comp ly wi th neutral laws that i nci dentallyp roscri be
conduct mandated by thei ndi vi dual's reli gi on or requi re conduct that
i s p rohi bi ted.14 As long as a law i s "generally app il cable" and not
desi gned wi th mali ce towards reli gi ousp racti ce andi s an area that the
state i s free to regulate, governments wi ll not usually be requi red to
p rovi de exemp ti ons to reli gi ous objectors.1 5 The Court further noted
that wi thout such a rule, there would be a "system i n whi ch each
consci ence i s a law unto i tself or i n whi ch judges wei gh the soci al
i mp ortance of all laws agai nst the centrali ty of all reli gi ous beli efs. "1 6
The Court i mp il ed that thi s rule was i n fact not really "new" because
i n the p ast the Court only held generally app il cable laws to be
i napp il cable when the Free Exerci se Clause was acti ng "i n conjuncti on
wi th other consti tuti onalp rotecti ons. " 17
Ei ghteen years before Smith,i n the archetypi cal free exerci se case,

Wisconsin v. Yoder,18

the Sup reme Court had held that Ami shp arents

10. The Free Exercise Clause is found within the Constitution's First Amendment:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (stating that the government may not burden a person's free exercise of religion
unless the burden advanced a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive
means of accomplishing that interest). In practice, however, the test was often not that strict.
See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
12. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
13. Id. at 874.
14. Id. at 878. This decision inspired fierce attack by many academics. For a
comprehensive history of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and a critique of Smith, see
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109 (1990).
15. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
16. Id. at 890.
17. Id. at 881.
18. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

Michigan Law Review

2212

[Vol. 103:2209

had a right tov iolate a state compulsory schooling law because the law
v iolated the parents' f ree exercise rights.19 With Yoder, the Court
reaff irmed

its v iew

that

ev en

generally

applicable

laws

must

sometimes giv e way to indiv idual free exercise rights. I n Smith, J ustice
Scalia' s opinion f or the Court rejected much of Yoder's f orce and
instead distinguished the case because it represented a "hybrid
situation" in which both parental rights20 and free exercise rights were
at stake.21 The claimants in
exercise

claim

Smith on the

other hand, presented a "f ree

unconnected with any communicativ e

activ ity or

parental right."22

Smith

completely

changed

the

landscape

of

free

exercise

jurisprudence.23 Although the Court created what has come to be
known as a "hybrid rights exception,"24 it shed v ery little light on the
scope of hybrid rights and how these claims should be treated in the
f uture.25 Congress, unhappy with the decision in

Smith

and unwilling

to rely on any hybrid rights exception, decided to take action. I n

1994,

19. Id. at 219 ("enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of
respondents' religious beliefs.").
20. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of parental rights as
fundamental under the Constitution.
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.l. Professor McConnell suggests that the creation of a
hybrid right was simply a means to distinguish Yoder. McConnell, supra note 14, at 1 121
("One suspects that the notion of 'hybrid' claims was created for the sole purpose of
distinguishing Yoder in this case."). Other prominent commentators have echoed this view.
See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 902 (1994) ("Justice Scalia had only five votes. He apparently
believed he couldn't overrule anything, and so he didn't. He distinguished everything away
instead.").
22. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
23. E.g. , McConnell, supra note 14, at 1 1 10-11 . The Smith Court also stated that it was
not overruling Sherbert v. Verner, which first announced the Free Exercise Clause's strict
scrutiny test. Id. Although the Court distinguished Sherbert because Sherbert did not involve
a claimant who broke a law, Smith still put to rest the notion that free exercise challenges
should always be granted strict scrutiny.
24. See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186,
1 202 (D. Wyo. 2002) (recognizing a '"hybrid rights' exception to neutral and generally
applicable regulation of religious conduct"). In order to comprehend the potential power of
the exception, consider two cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court on the same day.
In one, the Court used strict scrutiny to strike down two parents' convictions for home
schooling their child because their parental right was reinforced with a free exercise claim.
People v. Dejonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Mich. 1993). In the other case, the Court used a
low level of scrutiny in disallowing secular parents the right to home-school their children.
People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 115 (Mich. 1993). The only material difference between
the cases was the lack of a free exercise claim in Bennett that would have created a hybrid
right. See Roderick Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 144, 172 n.92 (2003) (noting how the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the parents'
claim in Bennett because it was not connected to a free exercise claim).
25. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.1 (describing hybrid situations but failing to elaborate
on how lower courts should address such situations in the future).
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Congress passed legislation through the RFRA that intended to once
again compel states

to grant religious

exemptions

to generally

applicable laws and returnf ree exercise jurisprudence to the pre-Smith
status quo.26
The RFRA was Congress' s attempt tof orce courts to apply stricter
scrutiny when states incidentally burdened religious f reedom.27 The
RFRA ev aded

Smith

by creating a statutory av enue through which a

claimant could attack a generally applicable law independent of the
Free Exercise Clause;28 it was not so much an attempt by Congress to
ov errule the Supreme Court' s

Smith

decision as it was an attempt to

make the decision irrelev ant. 29 This congressional sidestep was short
liv ed. In

City of Boerne, just

three years af ter President Clinton signed

the RFRA, the Supreme Court struck down the act as it applied to
states as an unconstitutional ov erstepping of Congress' s power under
the enabling prov ision of the Fourteenth Amendment.30
Af ter

City of Boerne,

parents like Ms. Cheema could no longer

brin g af ree exercise challenge coupled with a RFRA challenge against
a school board. A number of

states, howev er, passed their own

v ersions of the RFRA that hav e made it easier f or parents and other
claimants in those respectiv e states.31 Similarly, a f ew state supreme
courts hav e held that their state constitutions require a stricter testf or

26. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-1 (2000).
27. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb.
28. For example, even if a claim failed under the Free Exercise Clause, a claimant could
still claim a right to an exemption under the RFRA. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 921 (Cal. 1996).
29. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Under Section 5 of the Founeenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 309-11 (1996). Van
Alstyne opined:
[T)he directive (of the RFRA) is to dictate the legal effect courts are to give to any party's
free exercise claim - directing the court to give it the legal effect appropriate in Congress's
view (as stipulated in the statute), contrary to the judicial understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause. The RFRA means (and declares that it means) to make the alleged "right" of the
complaining party carry more by way of entitlement than the Court has declared the
Constitution provides. It does not put too fine a point on the matter to say that the RFRA is
meant to make the Jack of a meritorious First Amendment claim (an "unmeritorious" claim,
in the Supreme Court's view) utterly irrelevant.
Id. (citations omitted).
30. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("Broad as the power of Congress
is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.").
3 1 . The language of state RFRAs is similar to the original federal RFRA in that they
typically require that the government follow a compelling state interest/least restrictive
means standard. See ALA. CONST. of 1 901, amend. 622 (1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 411493.01 (2003); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. 52-571b (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03
(West 2002); IDAHO CODE § 73-402 (Michie 2003); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15 (2003); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (Michie 2003); 5 1 OKL A. STAT. tit. 51, § 253 (2002); 71 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2404 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2002);
TEX. CIV. PR AC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 1 1 0.001 (Vernon 2003).
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religious claims.32 N onetheless, in a state in which neither the court nor
the legislature has recognized the need f or higher scrutiny (which a
strong majority hav e not),33 parents are f orced to rely on

Smith's

hybrid language when searching f or a way to exempt their children
f rom certain neutral school actions which inf ringe upon their f ree
exercise of religion.
Parents wishing to assert their parental rights to direct the religious
upbringing of their children must rely on Smith's discussion of Yoder
and "hybrid situations."34 I n addition to the Free Exercise Clause, the
second

constitutional f oundation

of

this

hybrid

stems f rom

a

substantiv e due process theory that parents hav e a right to direct their
children' s upbringing.35 O ne f orm of this parental right is the "right[]
of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children. "36 This
parental right was of

course central to

Yoder,

but its history goes

f urther back into the golden age of substantiv e due process, beginning
with Pierce v. Society of Sisters.37 Pierce concerned an O regon act that
mandated that children aged eight through sixteen attend public
school.38 The Court, relying on a parental right to direct the education
of their children and send them to priv ate schools fi they wish, f ound
the O regon act unconstitutional.39 Although

Pierce

did not rely on the

32. See State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Wis. 1996); Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636
N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994); Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487
N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992).
33. The following thirty-five states do not follow a compelling interest test: Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
34. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.l.
35. The Court has recently confirmed that this right is firmly rooted within the
Constitution. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (describing the
longstanding history and vitality of the right). Although a splintered plurality opinion, a
majority of the Court makes it clear that some form - although unclear on the details - of
a parental rights due process doctrine is going to endure. Id. In fact, eight of the nine justices
recognized this right, although Justice Thomas questioned its legitimacy. See id at 65; id. at
77 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 86-87 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
36. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) ("However read, the Court's holding in
Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their
children.").
37. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
38. Id. at 530.
39. The court held that:

[R] ights

guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no

reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not

the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him

The Free Exercise of Religion
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Free Exercise Clause,40 the

Yoder Court specif ically read Pierce as a
"charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of

their children. " 41
f act, one of

Smith

did not attempt to ov errule

Pierce

or

Yoder;

in

the two specif ic hybrid rights the Court noted was one

concerning parental rights acting in conjunction with the Free Exercise
Clause.42
D espite

Smith's

implications,

lower

courts

hav e f ailed

to

univ ersally embrace hybrid rights, and the courts that hav e accepted
the idea hav e struggled to setf orth a consistent understanding of when
and how the constitutional right should apply.43 The circuit courts hav e
off ered three v ery diff erent general schools of

thought on how to

address a hybrid claim.44 Some circuits do not accept hybrid rights at
all. Ev en in those circuits that do accept hybrid rights, two distinct
modes of

analysis hav e dev eloped. As a result, claimants, attorneys,

and judges all appear deeply conf used about how exactly to f rame a
f ree

exercise hybrid rights

challenge.

Complicating matters,

the

Supreme Court has off ered no f urther guidance on who is right or
wrong.
This N ote argues that parents hav e af undamental right under the
U .S. Constitution to direct the religious upbringing of their children
and that courts interpreting

Smith

hav e systematically misunderstood

and misapplied the Supreme Court's conf using hybrid rights language.
Part I explains how

Yoder

and

Smith

create and preserv e parents'

right to direct the religious upbringing of their children. The essential
point is that the f ree exercise right and the parental right are not
examined independently and simply added together, but instead are
incorporated together to prov ide a specif ic bite to the f ree exercise
claim. Part I also examines the lower courts' treatment of hybrid rights

and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.

Id. at 535.
40. The claimants did stress the statute's negative impact on parochial schools and
religious liberty, but the Court probably ignored the free exercise nature of these claims
because the Clause's restrictions had not yet been placed upon state governments. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding for the first time that the free exercise
clause applies to the states).
41. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
42. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
43. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999)
(reviewing hybrid rights jurisprudence), rev'd en bane, 220 F.3d 1134 (2000).

44. The first school dismisses the hybrid language as mere dicta. See Leebaert v.
Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). The second school requires an independently viable
claim in conjunction with the free exercise claim. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc.,
68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). The third school requires a colorable claim in conjunction with
the free exercise claim. See Swanson v. Gutherie lndep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir.
1998).
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claims and argue s that no lowe r court has corre ctly articulate d the
hybrid ri ghts standard be cause the y have looke d sole ly at the language
on its face wi thout sufficie ntly e xami ning the purpose and history of
the

right. P art II de lve s dee pe r into the

Supre me

Court's Free

Exe rci se Clause jurisprude nce and argue s that pare ntal free e xe rci se
challe nge s to public school policie s must be analyze d unde r pre -Smith
scruti ny. Fore xample , the hybrid rights language re quire s that pare nts
have

a fundame ntal right to dire ct the re ligious upbringing of thei r

childre n ase xe mplifie d by

Yoder.

P art II furthe re xplains why pare ntal

free e xe rci se claims must be tre ate d se riously and propose s a solution
in how the scope of this right should be applie d by de tailing the prope r
scrutiny that courts must use .
I.

WHY LOWER COURTS FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THE
MEANING OF YODER & SMITH

Fundame ntal to Free Exe rci se Clause juri sprude nce i s the Court's
asse rtioni n Smith that " [t]he only de cisi ons in which we have he ld that
the

Fi rst

Ame ndme nt

bars

appli cati on

of

a

ne utral,

ge ne rally

applicable law to re ligi ously motivate d acti on have i nvolve d not the
Free

Exe rci se

Clause

alone ,

but

the

Free

Exe rcise

Clause

in

conjunction with othe r consti tuti onal prote ctions. "45 This part
addre sse s the implicati ons of thi s argume nt and e xplains how lowe r
courts have mi sinte rpre te d the language . Se ction I.A argue s that Smith
di d note xtinguish the pare ntal right to dire ct the re ligi ous upbringi ng
of one 's child. It note s the hybrid the ory implicit in Yoder's rationale
and de tails the spe ci al signifi cance of pare ntal free e xe rci se rights i n
e ducati on. Se ction I.B shows that circuit courts that have conclude d
that hybrid ri ghts do not e xist are ignoring Supre me Court pre ce de nt
and mi sconstrui ng the law. Se cti on l .Ce xamine s ci rcui t court de cisions
that

have

re cognize d

inde pe nde ntly
misunde rstand

hybrid

ri ghts

only

vi able
claim and conclude s
the
point of hybrid ri ghts.

whe n

the re

is

an

that the se
circui ts
In such case s an

inde pe nde ntly viable claim should by de fi nition be able to carry the
day on its own - inde pe nde ntly. Finally, Se cti on l .D e xamine s the
circuit courts that have re cogni ze d hybrid rights, but only re qui re a

45. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. For support of this statement, the Court cited Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (invalidating
a tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas on free exercise and
power of the press grounds); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (same); and
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a licensing system for religious and
charitable solicitations because the law abridged the free exercise of religion and the
freedom to communicate). The court also cited a number of cases decided on freedom of
speech and association grounds that also involved the free exercise of religion. See Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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colorable claim as opposed to an independently viable claim. These
courts have made a valiant effort but ultimately have misconstrued the
standard and therefore are equally ineffective at determining when an
exception to a generally applicable law is mandated.
A.

The

Smith

The Right of Parents to Direct the Religious
Upbringing of Their Children
Court, primarily because

of two

different policy

concerns, rejected the previously held idea that the Constitution
mandates certain religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws. 46 The fi rst concern was that if someone is entitled to evade
general laws merely because of religious convictions, that person
effectively becomes a "law unto himself. "47 The second concern
stemmed from the Court's fear that federal judges would be unable to
properly

balance

the

importance

of

general

laws

against

the

importance of an individual's religious convictions.48
The Court has long worried that too liberal an exemption policy
for free exercise challenges would eviscerate the rule of law and
proper enforcement. 49 The Court's concern boils down to a fear that in
a pluralistic U nited States, full of so many religions and faiths, a
sweeping exemption standard would grant virtually every individual a
constitutional right to ignore the law.

Smith

proclaimed that "such a

system would be courting anarchy" and the danger of anarchy
"increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious
beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. "50
Working alongside this trepidation was the Court's concern that
judges are not equipped to suffi ciently balance the rule of general laws
with an individual' s religious convictions. Combining the "horrible"
contemplation that federal judges must engage in balancing with the
possibility of "anarchy" if each man is a "law unto himself," the

Smith

Court proclaimed that it is the legislative process, not the courts,
which must safeguard the fr ee exercise of religion: 51

46. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889-90.
47. Id. at 879.
48. See id. at 889-90 n. 5 ("It is a parade of horribles because it is horrible to
contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws
the significance of religious practice.").
49. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879) ("Can a man excuse
his practices to the contrary [of law] because of his religious belief? To permit this would be
to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.") (holding that religious practice
was not a defense to polygamy laws).
50. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
51. In retrospect, it is clear that the Court meant specific state exemption clauses and
not sweeping, national legislative language. This is apparent because the Court subsequently
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It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not

widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic

government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a

law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.s2

The

me ri ts of the

addre sse d e lse whe re .s3

Court' s
The

argume nts have

basic

c ri ti que s

bee n sufficie ntly

are

that c ourts

wi ll

ulti mate ly deci de i f an e xe mpti on i s warrante d and the ref ore be able
to safe guard ge ne ral laws; that balanci ng c onf ilc ti ng i nte re sts i s the
ve ry thi ng judge s are suppose d to do and have always done; and that
le avi nge ve rythi ng to the e
l gi slati ve proce ss wi lle ff
ec it ve ly gut one of
the F ree Exe rci se

Clause' s pri mary purpose s- to protec t mi nori ty

fai ths from majori ty oppre ssi on.s4 The purpose of thi s Note , howe ve r,
i s not to c ri ti que
e xplai n why the

Smith.

Rathe r, i t i s to unde rstand the deci si on and

hybri d ri ght of pare nts to di rec t the

re il gi ous

upbri ngi ng of thei rc hi ld re n de se rve s speci al sc ruti ny.
By di sti ngui shi ng

Yoder, Smith c

onf
i rme d that the

deci si on re mai ne d good law.ss F urthe rmore , the
me ans for di sti ngui shi ng
Exe rci se

Clause

was

Yoder abundantlyc el

ar-i n

ac ti ng i n c onjunc it on

Court' s

1972

Court made

Yoder, the

wi th

the

the
F ree

"ri ght

pare nts . . . to di rec t the e duc ati on of thei r c hil dre n,"s6 whi le i n

of

Smith

the free e xe rc i se c lai m stood alone . The longstandi ng ambi gui ty of the
deci si on c ome s not from what the Court sai d i n
the opi ni on di d not say- the

Smith,

but from what

Court offe re d no support for why i t

should matte r that the two ri ghts we re ac ti ng "i n c onjunc ti on." Thi s
see mi nglyi llogic al c onc lusi onc ouple d wi th a lack of support has bee n
the re ason that hybri d ri ghts have recei ve d the i re of lowe rc ourts and
c omme ntators alik e . It i s true that
hybri d ri ghts, but i t c annot be

Smith

offe re d no justific ati on for

automatic ally c onc lude d that hybri d

ri ghts are i llogic al si mply bec ause of thei r lack of support. Although
supporti s lacki ngi n

Smith, the

logic be hi nd a pare ntal hybri d ri ghtc an

be found e mbe dde di n free e xe rci se pri nci ple s and the

Yoder opi

ni on

i tse lf.
Chie f J ustice Burge r's opi ni on i n
be

the hi gh wate r mark

Yoderi

s c onsi de re d by many to

of free e xe rci se protec ti on.s7 Be fore

Smith,

struck down the RFRA while favorably citing state exceptions to drug laws for religious
peyote use. Id. at 890.
52. Id. ·
53. See, e.g. , McConnell, supra note 14, at 1141-50.
54. Id.
55. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: Why RFRAs Don't Work, 31 LOY. U. Ou L.J. 153, 161 (2000).
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was vi ewed as a proc lamati on that even generally applic able

laws must someti mes gi ve way toi ndi vi dual free exerci se exc epti ons.58

Smith seems to have devastated that
Yoder i ntac t.59 In order to understand

vi ew whi le somehow leavi ng
that anomaly,

Yoder

must be

read c arefully to rec ogniz e the subtle i nterplay between parents' free
exerc i se ri ghts and thei r ri ght to di rec t thei rc hi ldren's educ ati on.
Fi rst,

Yoder wasc

lear that parental c lai ms to di rec t the educ ati on

of thei r c hi ldren, absent any reli gi ous groundi ng, would never be
enough to grant an exc epti on to a general law: "A way of il fe, however
vi rtuous and admi rable, may not be i nterposed as a barri er to
reasonable state regulati on of educ ati oni fi ti s based on purely sec ular
c onsi derati ons; to have the protec ti on of the Reli gi on Clauses, the
c lai ms must be rooted i n reli gi ous beli ef."60 F rom language ilk e thi s,
some assumed that the F ree Exerci se Clause di d all the work i n

Yoder,61

but suc h an assumpti oni gnores muc h of the opi ni on's text.

Vi ewi ng

Yoder

si mply as a free exerci se c ase i gnores the Court's

repeated referenc es to the i mportanc e of the parental ri ghts at stak e.
The Court wrote that the c ase i nvolved "the fundamental i nterest of
parents, as c ontrasted wi th that of the State, to gui de the reli gi ous
future and educ ati on of thei r c hi ldren."62 F urthermore, " [t] he hi story
and c ulture of Western ci vi ilz ati on reflec t a strong tradi ti on of
parentalc onc ern for the nurture and upbri ngi ng of thei rc hi ldren. Thi s
pri mary role of the parents i n the upbri ngi ng of thei r c hi ldren i s now
establi shed beyond debate as an enduri ng Americ an tradi ti on."63
Fi nally, the Court c harac teriz ed

Pierce

v.

Society of Sisters

as "a

c harter of the ri ghts of parents to di rec t the reli gi ous upbri ngi ng of
thei rc hi ldren. "64
Most i mportantly, the Court held that " when the i nterests of
parenthood

are combined

wi th a free exerci se c lai m of the nature

58. See, e.g., Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1 121, 1 123 (8th Cir. 1984) ("Before the state
may refuse to issue [the requested exemption], 'It must appear either that the State does not
deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause."') (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)).
59. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.l.
60. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. The Court then adds that "if the Amish asserted their claims
because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values
accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated
himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis." Id. at 216.
61. See Brian A. Freeman, Trends in First Amendment Jurisprudence: Expiating the Sins
of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral
Laws of General Applicability, 66 Mo. L. REV. 9, 54 (2001) ("Certainly the Court in Yoder
referred to no right other than free exercise.").
62. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 233.
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re ve ale d by thi s rec ord, more than me re ly a ' re asonable re lati on to
some purpose wi thi n the c ompe te nc y of the State' i s re qui re d to
sustai n

the

vali di ty

Amendment."65

of the

State 's

re qui re me nt

under the First
Yoderi s

It i s he re that the "hybri d" i mpac t at work i n

most e vi de nt.66 The

free e xe rci se c lai m worki ng toge the r wi th the

pare ntalc lai m de se rve s more than " re asonable re lati on" re vie w.67
F urthe r possi ble c onfusi on c ome s from tryi ng to deci phe r what
ri ght i s ac tually doi ng the work i n

Yoder.

The Court he ld that whe n

"the i nte re sts of pare nthood are c ombi ne d wi th a free e xe rci se c lai m"

Yoder,

the re

re lati onshi p to a e
l gi ti mate

aki n to the c lai m i n

state

" State 's re qui re me nt

must be

more

than a re asonable

purpose i n orde r to sati sfy the

under the First Amendment."68

More ove r, the

Court affi rme d the Wi sc onsi n Supre me Court's deci si on that Y ode r' s
c onvic ti on was "i nvali d unde r the F ree Exe rci se Clause of the Fi rst
Ame ndme nt to the

U ni te d State s Consti tuti on. "69 Thus,

holdi ng falls unde r the Fi rst Ame ndme nt.

Yoder

Yoder's

re ste d on the free

e xe rc i se ri ghts of pare nts, not on thei r ri ghts to c ontrol public sc hool
e duc ati on.70 Re il gi oni s the nece ssary forc e unde rlyi ng
re sult i s that ce rtai n free e xe rci se c lai ms are
whic h i s the

Yoder.

The e nd

paramount- one

fundame ntal ri ght of pare nts to c ontrol the

of

re il gi ous

de sti ny of thei rc hi ldre n,e ve ni n the face of public e duc ati on.

Yoder di d

not hold that the ri ght to di rec t the upbri ngi ng of one 's

c hi ld i s provi de d a hi ghe r de gree of protec ti on whe n i t i s re il gi ously
moti vate d, but rathe r, that the free e xe rci se c halle nge i s provi de d a
hi ghe r de gree

of protec ti on whe n re li gi on ac ts i n c onjunc it on wi th

pare ntal ri ghts. Our c ountry has tradi ti onally bee n dee ply c once rne d
wi th i nfri nge me nts on free e xe rc i se

that di rec tly affec t the

ri ght of

pare nts to de te rmi ne the re il gi ous upbri ngi ng of thei r c hi ldre n.71 The
Court e xpilci tly he ld that the pare ntal ri ght on i ts own i s not e nough.
But that doe s not me an that the free e xe rc i se c lai m on i ts owni s not

65. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925)).
66. It is much easier to make sense of the hybrid metaphor when Yoder's "combined
with" language is recognized.
67. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
68. See id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 207.
70. The court could not have been clearer on this point: "Nothing we hold is intended to
undermine the general applicability of the State's compulsory school-attendance statutes or
to limit the power of the State to promulgate reasonable standards that, while not impairing
the free exercise of religion, provide for continuing agricultural vocational education . . . . " Id.
at 236 (emphasis added).
71. See id. at 231-32 (referencing the Court's previous recognitions of the "traditional
concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education of their minor
children" and stating that the "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children
is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition").
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e no ugh. The free e xe rci se c lai m may i n fac t c arry the wei ght o n i ts
o wn, but o nly ce rtai n type s o f free e xe rci se c lai ms may do

so . In

f
o re xample ,i t was tho se c lai ms thati nvo v
l e a pare nt's atte mpt
to gui de the re il gio use duc atio no f hi sc hi ld. Fo r the se type so fc lai ms,

Yoder,

co urts must use a mo re e xac ti ng e
l ve lo f sc ruti ny.72
Appro ac hi ng the pare ntal hybri d ri ght thi s way allo ws o ne to give
mo re c re de nce to
doi ng mo re

Smith's

language whi e
l re alizi ng that the Co urt was

than me re ly sugge sti ng that two i nv ali d co nsti tutio nal

c laims adde d to ge the re qualo ne v ali dc lai m.73 Fo reve ni f the primary
purpo se o f de sc ri bi ng Yoder as a hybri d right was i n o rde r to
di sti ngui sh the c ase ,74 the c harac te riz atio n sti ll re mai ns vi able and
fai thful

to

Yoder's

co nfusio n i s that the

speci fic

proc lamatio ns.

wo rd " hybri d" o r the

Pe rhaps
phrase

part o f the

"i n co njunc tio n

wi th" are no t preci se de sc ri ptio ns o f the Co urt's thi nki ng. Inste ad o f
vie wi ngi ndivi dualco nsti tutio nal rights asco mple te ly se to ff fro mo ne
ano the ri ni ndivi dual bo xe s - as the wo rd " hybri d" and the phrase "i n
co njunc tio n wi th" may sugge st - i t i s mo re preci se to

thi nk o f the

ri ghts as inte rco nnec te d sphe re s. Thi nki ng o f a ki nd o f co nsti tutio nal
Ve nn

di agram

allo ws o ne

to

vi sualize

a

mo re

po we rful

Fi rst

Ame ndme nt free e xe rci se c ase whe n the sphe re i si nte rco nnec te d wi th
pare ntal ri ghts.75 It appe ars mo re
Exe rci se

acc urate

to c lai m that the

F ree

Clause i nco rpo rate s pare ntal ri ghts i n thi s i nstance ,

as

o ppo se d to ac ti ngi n co njunc tio n wi th the m.76 Re gardle ss o f ho w o ne
c harac te rize si t,

Smith stands

as a reco gni tio n thati ndivi dual ri ghts do

72. This idea is hardly novel in constitutional jurisprudence. For example, there are at
least three different tiers of scrutiny used under equal protection analysis. Staying within the
First Amendment context, the Court uses different standards of review for freedom of
speech claims depending on the circumstances of the infringement. See Vieth v. Jubelirer,
124 S. Ct. 1769, 1786 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("It is elementary that scrutiny levels are
claim specific. An action that triggers a heightened level of scrutiny for one claim may
receive a very different level of scrutiny for a different claim because the underlying rights,
and consequently constitutional harms, are not comparable.").
73. See Eric A. DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: Does the Tie Still
Bind?, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 363 n. 69 (2003) ("One can question whether the hybrid
claim exception makes sense, as it appears the Court is engaging in a form of new math,
suggesting that 0 + 0 1.").
=

74. See supra note 21.
75. Cf Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yannes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 477, 548 (1991 ). Glendon and Yannes state:
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Employment Division v. Smith, moreover, reveals a
majority ready to take account of the interplay among the various parts of the Bill of Rights,
specifically, the ways in which one constitutional value can be amplified or muted by its
association with other constitutional values.

Id.
76. By incorporate, I mean that the two rights combine together in order to form a
united whole. The word "hybrid," on the other hand, connotes some type of unnatural
pairing resulting in mutation.
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note xist in a vac uum, but inste ad inte rplay and work toge the r as we ll
as againste ac h othe r.77
B.

Although the

Mere Dicta: Circuit Courts Denying the
Existence of Hybrid Rights
Smith

Court ref use d to ove rrule

Yoder

and inste ad

re lie d on it as an e xample of a c ase in whic h "the F irst Ame ndme nt
bars applic ation of a ne utral, ge ne rally applic able law to re ligiously
motivate d ac tion,"78 two c irc uits have dec ide d to ignore the

Court's

language and de ny the e xiste nce of hybrid rights.79
In

Kissinger v. Board of Trustees,80

distric t c ourt's dismissal of
unde r 42 U .S.C. §
State

1988

the Sixth Circ uit aff irme d the

Ms. K issinge r's c laim fo r attorne y's fee s

bec ause the c ourt de te rmine d that The Ohio

U nive rsity was not re quire d to alte r its ve te rinary-me dic ine

c urric ulum in orde r to acc ommodate Ms. K issinge r's re ligious be lie f s.81
The c ourt distinguishe d

Yoder

by stating that the

re quire d to atte nd Ohio State , while

plaintif f

the c hildre n in

was not

Yoder

we re

c halle nging a law that re quire d the ir atte ndance at public sc hool.82 The
c ourt also re jec te d Ms. K issinge r's hybrid rights c laim.83 D rawing
stre ngth f rom a rece nt J ustice

Soute r c onc urre nce c ritic izing the

hybrid rights e xce ption,84 the c ourt state d that the ide a that the e
l gal
standard unde r the F ree Exe rc ise Clause would c hange de pe nding on
whe the r

the

free e xe rc ise

c halle nge

was c ouple d

with

anothe r

c onstitutional protec tion was "c omple te ly illogic al. "85 F inally, the

77. See id. ("What Scalia referred to as 'hybrid' cases requiring a higher level of scrutiny
were those in which the plaintiffs' claims seemed especially strong because they were
supported by mutually reinforcing constitutional rights"). Cf Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (noting "the intimate relation between the [Fourth and Fifth]
amendments").
78. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
79. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003); Kissinger v. Bd. of
Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180-81 (6th Cir. 1993).
80. 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 178.
82. Id. at 180-81. It seems that the case could have been distinguished on simpler
grounds, namely, that Kissinger was not a parent objecting to a law which interfered with the
rights of a parent to direct the religious upbringing of her child during the child's formative
years.
83. In addition to her free exercise claim, Ms. Kissinger also made section 1983 claims
based on her freedom of speech, association, and her rights to due process and equal
protection. Id. at 179.
84. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
85. Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180. The court also confessed that it could not "see how a state
regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights
but would not violate the free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional
rights." Id.
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Court holds that e
l gal

standards unde r the F ree Exe rc ise Clause vary de pe nding on whe the r
othe r c onstitutional rights are implic ate d, we will not use a stric te r
e
l gal standard than that use d in

Smith toe valuate

ge ne rally applic able ,

e xce ptionle ss state re gulations unde r the F ree Exe rc ise Clause."86
The Sec ond Circ uitf ollowe d the Sixth Circ uit' s e
l ad. In

Harrington,87 the c ourt he
of

his c hild did not re quire

mandatory

L eebaert v.

ld that af athe r's right to direc t the e duc ation

he alth c lass.88

his son's sc hool to e xe mpt him f rom a
The

c ourt f ound

that

the re

was

no

"f undame ntal right of e ve ry pare nt to te ll a public sc hool what his or
he rc hild will and will not be taught,"89 that hisc laim was not gove rne d
by

Yoder,90 and that a hybrid right did note xist. The c ourt adopte d the
Kissinger and agree d that the re was "no good re ason f or

language of

the standard of re vie w [inf ree e xe rc ise c ase s] to vary simply with the
numbe r of c onstitutional rights that the

plaintiff

asse rts have

bee n

violate d."91 Like the Kissingerc ourt, the Sec ond Circ uit did not tre at
Yoder as an e xample of a hybrid c laim, but inste ad as a diffe re nt
me ans in whic h the plaintiff was c halle nging the ge ne rally applic able
law.92 By distinguishing

Yoder

on its f ac ts and the n addre ssing the

hybridc laim, the c ourtf aile d to re alize that

Yoder is

the hybrid rights

situation.
The diff c
i ulty with both c ourts' re asoningc an be st be summe d up
with this que stion: If the re is no suc h thing as a hybrid right, and fi the
F ree Exe rc ise
c omply

with

Clause ne ve r re lie ve s individuals of the
ne utral

mandate d by the

laws

inc ide ntally

obligation to

prosc ribe

c onduc t

individual' s re ligion or re quire c onduc t that is

prohibite d, how c an one

Yoder?

that

possibly e xplain the

Court' s re asoning in

The answe r is that one c annot; the Sec ond and Sixth Circ uits

simply ignore d this que stion.93 Eve n fi

the se c ourts acce pte d the

86. Id.
87. 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
88. Id. at 142. It is important to note that the Connecticut class had an opt-out provision
which entitled a parent to excuse their child for the six classes dealing with family life
instruction and AIDS education. Id. at 137.
89. Id. at 141.
90. Id. at 144. The court concluded that the class did not threaten Mr. Leebaert's "entire
way of life" as the law in Yoder did, and therefore Yoder did not apply. Id.
91. Id. The court further noted that "Smith's 'language relating to hybrid claims is dicta
and not binding on this court."' Id. at 143 (quoting Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health,
275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)).
92. Id.
93. The Ninth Circuit has accused the Sixth Circuit of taking "the path of least
resistance" in Kissinger by throwing "up its hands up in despair" in the face of Smith's hybrid
language. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 1999),
rev'd en bane, 220 F.3d 1 1 34 (2000).
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re asoning offe re d by many that the only purpose of J ustice
hybrid rights e xce ption was to distinguish

Yoder,94

Sc alia' s

it is imprope r fo r

lowe r c ourts to simply dismiss Supre me Court language as unbinding
bec ause the y be lie ve the y are able to dec iphe r a dee pe r motive within
the language that disqual ifie s the language itse lf.95
Courts that dismisse d Smith's hybrid language while rec ogniz ing

Yoder

as good law gave

no indic ation or re asoning for why

Yoder

would still re quire stric te r sc rutiny.96 The c ourts simply rec ogniz e d that

Yoder

did rece ive

language

was

inc omple te as

Yoder whe

stric te r sc rutiny and the n state d that the

hybrid

dic ta without offe ring an alte rnative

Smith's

the ory.97 As
language may be , it at e
l ast atte mpte d to justify

n it distinguishe d the c ase .98 If a lowe rc ourt wishe s to stamp

the hybrid language as dic ta in ac ase analogous to

Yoder, it must offe

r

a diffe re nt re ason why Yoder itse lf rece ive d highe r sc rutiny, since the
c ase re mains good law. Implying that the Supre me Court is mak ing
disinge nuous e fforts not to ove rrule

its own prece de nt is not good

e nough.
F urthe rmore , the re
language

than a simple

is in fac t more

to J ustic e

me ans to distinguish

Sc alia' s hybrid

Yoder.99

F irst,

Yoder's

94. See Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5, 30 (1995) (stating that the exception
is "an unartful tool to distinguish troubling precedent"); Alan Brownstein, Protecting
Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L.
& POL. 119, 187 (2002) (stating that the Smith court's hybrid exception served the specific
function of allowing the Court to avoid overruling Yoder); McConnell, supra note 14, at 1121
("One suspects that the notion of 'hybrid' claims was created for the sole purpose of
distinguishing Yoder in this case."). Other commentators have attacked the existence of
hybrid rights on more fundamental grounds akin to the Kissinger and Leebaert courts. Some
echo Justice Souter's belief that the exception could swallow the rule. See Douglas Laycock
& Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV.
209, 214 (1994) ("The hybrid rights exception, which purported to protect free exercise in
association with some other constitutional right (such as speech or association), has been
rejected precisely because it had the potential to swallow the rule."). Others have concluded
that the doctrine merely mandates that one add unsuccessful constitutional claims on top of
each other and therefore the doctrine is completely illogical. See DeGroff, supra note 73, at
363 n. 69 ("One can question whether the hybrid claim exception makes sense, as it appears
the Court is engaging in a form of new math, suggesting that 0 + 0
1."); Eric J. Neal, The
Ninth Circuit's "Hybrid Rights" Error: Three Losers Do Not Make a Winner in Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 24 SEA:TILE UNIV. L. REV. 169 (2000) (stating that
three insufficient challenges cannot add up to a sufficient one, and also somewhat quizzically
suggesting that if a court undertakes its analysis properly, a hybrid rights exception cannot
be found in Smith).
=

95. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705 (stating that it was not the Ninth Circuit's place to
"speculate or hypothesize about the Justices' true intentions").
96. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003); Kissinger v. Bd. of
Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180-81 (6th Cir. 1993).
97.

See Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 144; Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180-81.

98. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
99. Professor McConnell, on the other hand, believes that if the Court was truly sincere
about hybrid rights, they would have recognized one using the facts of Smith itself. See
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proc lamation that highe r sc rutiny was nee de d whe n " the inte re sts of
pare nthood are c ombine d with a free e xe rc ise c laim"100c lose ly mirrors

Smith's

" inc onjunc tion with" language . Thisce rtainly we ake nsc laims

that Justice Sc alia plucke d hybrid rights out of thin air.101 Sec ond, in
disse nt, Justice

Sc alia had shortly be fore

Smith c ite

d the

Court' s

rec ognition that "in some c irc umstance s State s must acc ommodate the
be lie fs

of re ligious c itize ns

applic able
was

by e xe mpting

re gulations."102 This language

think ing

approvingly

of

the m

from

ge ne rally

sugge sts that Justice

re ligious e xce ptions

applic able state laws be fore he e ve r wrote the

Smith

to

opinion.103 Third,

the Court had a c hance to re fine its language or disc ard it in

Boerne v. Flores.104 Inste ad, Justice
Smith's holding and once again offe re

Sc alia

ge ne rally

City of

Ke nne dy' s opinion re affirme d
d

Yoder as a distinguishable c

ase

bec ause " [t] hat c ase implic ate d not only the right to the free e xe rc ise
of re ligion but also the

e duc ation. " 105

right of pare nts to c ontrol the ir c hildre n' s

It is ce rtainly possible to c lassify the

Court' s hybrid language

as

dic ta, although it is que stionable

that Justice

bec ause the Court re lie d on

in its dec ision, 107 the rationale of

the c ase
support.

must be

Smith

Yoder

Sc alia would.106 But

de alt with se riously whe n a c laimant use s it as

off
e re d one way to de al with

Yoder

-

hybrid rights. If

a lowe r c ourt c onside rs that me thod dic ta and re jec ts it as suc h, the
c ourt the n has a duty to offe r an alte rnative le gal the ory upon whic h
future c laimants may re ly, bec ause the law still holds that

Yoder se

rve s

as ane xample of ane xce ption to the ge ne ral rule .

McConnell, supra note 14, at 1122. This claim is open to debate. Although this Note will not
engage in an extensive digression into free speech doctrine, it is questionable whether or not
the religious purpose of smoking peyote represents any type of protected communicative
activity.
100. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
101. See supra note 94.
102. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 617 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Edwards was decided in 1987, three years before Smith.
104. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
105. Id. at 513-14.
106. Although the language was not central to the Court's holding, it is arguable that the
language was central to the Court's reasoning in Smith. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S.
451, 469 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's attempt to offer a "concept
of dictum that includes the very reasoning of the opinion"). Furthermore, lower courts have
recognized that they should "consider and respect Supreme Court dicta as well as holdings
because the Supreme Court hears relatively few cases and frequently uses dicta to give
guidance to the lower courts." Town Sound and Custom Tops v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 959
F.2d 468, 496 n.41 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane).
107. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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Independently Viable Claims: Circuit Courts Recognizing Hybrid
Rights While Eviscerating Their Power
Only the Sec ond and Sixth Circ uits have gone so far as to proc laim

that a hybrid right c an ne ve r e xist.108 But othe r c ourts that have
rec ognize d hybrid rights none the e
l ss have struggle d to imple me nt a
c ohe re nt standard.109 The struggle is appare nt whe n one e xamine s the
ide a of an inde pe nde ntly viable c laim re quire me nt use d by the F irst
Circ uit1 10 and once by the D .C. Circ uit. 1 1 1 Inste ad of dismissing Smith's
hybrid language as dic ta, the se Circ uits re quire that in orde r to rece ive
stric te r sc rutiny,c laimants must offe r an inde pe nde ntly viable c laim in
addition to the ir free e xe rc ise c laim.112
In

Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Products, Inc. ,

two high sc hool

stude nts and the ir pare nts sue d the direc tors of an AID S aware ne ss
program and the sc hool c ommittee for what the y c onside re d an
offe nsive mandatory asse mbly.113 The plaintiffs file d a se xually hostile
e nvironme nt c laim and also c laime d that the asse mbly de prive d the
c hildre n

of the ir privac y

proce dural due

rights,

proce ss rights,

substantive

and

c onjunc tion with a pare ntal right to direc t the
c hildre n.114 The

due

proce ss

the ir free e xe rc ise

rights,
right in

upbringing of the ir

F irst Circ uit found all the se c laims to be

without

me rit.115

108. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003); Kissinger v. Bd. of
Trustees, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1 993).
109. See e.g. , Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
1 1 0. Id. at 539.
1 1 1 . EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
1 12. See Brown, 68 F.3d at 539.
1 13. Id. at 529. The complaint alleged that the director of the assembly:
1) told the students that they were going to have a "group sexual experience, with audience
participation"; 2) used profane, lewd, and lascivious language to describe body parts and
excretory functions; 3) advocated and approved oral sex, masturbation, homosexual sexual
activity, and condom use during promiscuous premarital sex; 4) simulated masturbation; 5)
characterized the loose pants worn by one minor as "erection wear"; 6) referred to being in
"deep sh(it]" after anal sex; 7) had a male minor lick an oversized condom with her, after
which she had a female minor pull it over the male minor's entire head and blow it up; 8)
encouraged a male minor to display his "orgasm face" with her for the camera; 9) informed a
male minor that he was not having enough orgasms; 10) closely inspected a minor and told
him he had a "nice butt"; and 11) made eighteen references to orgasms, six references to
male genitals, and eight references to female genitals.
Id. at 529.
1 14. Id. at 530.
1 1 5. Id. at 541. Although the RFRA was in force during the appeal, the court found that
it did not apply retroactively and therefore it should not be applied to the assembly, which
took place before the RFRA's enactment. Id. at 537-38.
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hybrid c laim, the c ourt first addre sse d the

pare ntal right to direc t the
que stione d whe the r the

upbringing of the ir c hildre n,116 but also

pare ntal right was

fundame ntal117 - a

que stion that is now se ttle d in the affirmative . 118 The F irst Circ uit the n
c orrec tlyc onc lude d that standing by itse lf, the pare ntal right found in

Pierce

and

Meyer

v.

Nebraska119

was not broade nough to force public

sc hools to ame nd the irc urric ulum fore ve ry c hild whose pare nts have
"ge nuine moral disagree me nts with [a] sc hool' s c hoice of subje c t
matte r."120 The

Court had rec ognize d pare ntal due

Meyer

proce ss

rights in holding unc onstitutional a Ne braska statute
public

sc hools from te ac hing in any language

The diffe re nce be twee n
that the

first c ase

Meyer

and

"involve [d]

the

that prohibite d
othe r than English. 121

Brown,

the F irst Circ uit note d, is

state

prosc ribing pare nts from

e duc ating the irc hildre n, while the sec ond involve d pare nts pre sc ribing
what the state shall te ac h the irc hildre n. "122
The c ourt the n c onside re d the
free e xe rc ise hybrid c laim.
Esse ntially, the F irst Circ uit split this c laim into two distinc t te sts:
(1) is the

free e xe rc ise c halle nge c onjoine d with an "inde pe nde ntly

protec te dc onstitutional protec tion";123 or (2) doe s the c laim fall within
the "swee p of
the

Yoder"?124

pare nts faile d the

The c ourt made a swift de te rmination that

first te st bec ause

the ir pare ntal rights c laim

faile d and the re fore the y did not make out an inde pe nde ntly viable
c laim.125 The c ourt state d that the pare nts' c laim also faile d the sec ond
te st bec ause the y faile d to show a thre at to the ir "e ntire way of life "

116. Id. at 533. The parents addressed this issue by claiming that the "defendants
violated their privacy right to direct the upbringing of their children and educate them in
accord with their own views." Id. at 532. It seems odd to characterize this right as one of
privacy as opposed to being found more generally in the Due Process Clause's "liberty"
language. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
117. Id. at 533. The court also stated that the parental rights foundational cases would
likely be decided today on First Amendment grounds because the Amendment has since
been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 533 n.5.
118. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
119. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For a discussion of Pierce, see supra notes 37-41 and
accompanying text.
120. Brown, 68 F.3d at 534.
121. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
122. Brown, 68 F.3d at 534.
123. Id. at 539.
124. Id. The court's discussion of this issue was confined to the parents' claims for
monetary damages. The court also found that the claimants lacked the standing required for
declaratory relief. Id.
125. Id. The court did not state any reason for why this was the proper test to use nor
did the court discuss the origins of the test.
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and the ir situation was the re fore " qualitative ly distinguishable " from

Yoder.126
Le ss than a ye ar late r, the D .C. Circ uit dec ide d

University of America. 127

The

c ase

EEOC v. Catholic

mate rialize d

afte r

Catholic

U nive rsity de nie d te nure to a D ominic an nun who subse que ntly file d
a Title V II c laim against the U nive rsity.128 In a c omple x opinion, the
c ourt he ld that it was barre d from rev ie wing the e mployme nt dec ision
bec ause of the ministe riale xce ption to the Free Exe rc ise Clause 129 and
bec ause

to do so would have c onstitute d e xce ssive e ntangle me nt

be twee n c hurc h and state unde r the Establishme nt Clause .13° But the
c ourt also state d thateve n if the ministe riale xce ption did not survive

Smith,

a "hybrid right" would be rec ogniz e d bec ause the c ourt found

the e xce ssive e ntangle me nt c laim inde pe nde ntly viable .131 Although

the c ourt did not ide ntify this te st as the

" inde pe nde ntly v iable "

approac h, the approac h is substantially the same as the one adopte d

by the First Circ uit.132
The inde pe nde ntly viable approac h to hybrid rightsc laims pre se nts
many of the same proble ms that are inhe re nt in the Sixth and Sec ond
Circ uits' approac h of simply de nying the right'se xiste nce .133 Although
c ourts that follow the

inde pe nde ntly v iable

good faith atte mpt to adhe re to

Smith,

approac h are

mak ing a

the approac h will typic ally e
l ad

to the ev isce ration of all hybrid rights. If the

inde pe nde ntly viable

c laim on its own c an raise the e
l ve l of sc rutiny, the re is no nee d to

126. Id. ("Here, the plaintiffs do not allege that the one-time compulsory attendance at
the Program threatened their entire way of life. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' free exercise
claim for damages was properly dismissed.").
127. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
128. Id. at 459-60.
129. Id. at 461. Essentially, the ministerial exception precludes courts "from
adjudicating employment discrimination suits by ministers against the church or religious
institution employing them." Id.
130. Id. at 466.
131. See id. at 467 ("As a consequence, this case presents the kind of "hybrid situation"
referred to in Smith that permits us to find a violation of the Free Exercise Clause even if
our earlier conclusion that the ministerial exception survived Smith should prove
mistaken."). Although outside of the sphere of parental rights, the Catholic University
decision merits discussion because it is one of the few cases in which the court actually
recognized the existence of a hybrid right. The existence of the right in this case was entirely
peripheral, however, because the court had already decided the question using the
ministerial exception. Furthermore, free exercise challenges in conjunction with
Establishment Clause challenges were not among the challenges that Smith sought to
distinguish.
132. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1 148 (9th Cir.

2000) (stating that both Brown and Catholic University stand for the proposition that "a free
exercise claim based on the hybrid rights exception must include at least a colorable claim of
infringement of a companion right").
133. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
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invoke the Free Exe rc ise Clause at all, e
l t alone in c onjunc tion with
the

inde pe nde nt right.134 This point is be st summe d up in Justice

Soute r's

Church of Lukumi Babalu

v.

City ofHialeahc

onc urre nce:

But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an
exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under
another constitutional provision, then there would have been no reason

for the Court in what

Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the

Free Exercise Clause at all.135

To

illustrate

Justice

hypothe tic al re sult in

Soute r' s

Brown:

The

point, c onside r

a

First Circ uit inste ad

diffe re nt
initially

c onc lude s that the pare nts' substantive due proce ss right to direc t the
upbringing of the irc hildre n automatic ally trigge rs he ighte ne d sc rutiny
whe ne ve r pare nts objec t to a public sc hool' sc urric ulum.136 The sc hool
would the n be force d to provide its re asons for the c urric ulumc hoic e
and also show that the c urric ulum was suffic e
i ntly tailore d to advance
those re asons. But it would be unnece ssary for suc h a ruling to e ve n
c onside r the free e xe rc ise c halle nge . If one agree s with this re asoning,
the n the ac tual re asoning of
the

pare nts faile d to state

Brown

a viable

also make s pe rfec t se nse: bec ause
substantive due

proce ss right to

direc t the upbringing of the ir c hildre n, the Free Exe rc ise Clause c an
add nothing to the ir c laim.137 So unde r e ithe r approac h, the

Free

Exe rc ise Clause se rve s no purpose and the hybrid rights e xce ption is
e ntire ly illusory.138
D .

Colorable Claims: Circuit Courts Searching for Meaningful
Hybrid Rights Ground

In an atte mpt to add more c larity and substance to
rights language , the

Smith's

hybrid

Te nth139 and Ninth140 Circ uits adopte d a third

approac h to e xamining free e xe rc ise c laims made in c onjunc tion with

1 34. See Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 467.
1 35. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring).
136. This, of course, would be an absurd misreading of precedent since the Court has
never suggested that schools have to justify their curriculum in response to every parental
objection. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
137. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995).
138. See Anthony Merlino, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic Confessional
from Unprotected Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 655, 689 (2002) (writing
that the independently viable claim approach makes the free exercise claim "mere
surplusage").
1 39. See Swanson v. Gutherie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998). It is
notable that the plaintiff's case was argued by Professor Laycock, a prominent Free Exercise
Clause scholar. See Laycock, supra note 94.

140. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999),
rev'd en bane, 220 F.3d 1134 (2000).
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ano the r co nsti tutio nal ri ght. Thi s appro ac h re qui re s so me thi ng e
l ss
than an i nde pe nde ntly vi able c lai m: a co o
l rable c lai m.141 Agai n, thi s
appro ac h sho ws the

di ffic ulty i n i nte rpre ti ng and i mple me nti ng a

co he re nt hybri d ri ghts standard.142
In

Swanson v. Gutherie Independent School District,143

Swanso n and he r pare nts sue d the

Guthe rie

Annie

Sc hoo l Di stric t i n an

atte mpt to fo rce the sc hoo l to e
l t he r atte nd part-ti me i n o rde r to
supple me nt he r ho me sc hoo il ng.144 Annie fi e
l d a free e xe rci se c lai m
agai nst the

sc hoo l bo ard and he r pare nts fi e
l d a c lai m agai nst the

sc hoo l bo ard fo r de nyi ng the m the ri ght to di rec t the upbri ngi ng o f
thei rc hi ld.145 The Te nth Ci rc ui t he ld that the sc hoo l's po ilc y was vali d
and that Annie was no te nti tle d to ane xe mptio n.146
The co urt fi rst addre sse d the

Swanso ns' c lai m that the

po ilc y

vio late d Annie 's free e xe rci se o f re il gio n bec ause the po ilc y was no t
ge ne rally applic able . Afte r di smi ssi ng Annie 's fre e e xe rci se c lai m o n
proce dural gro unds,147 the co urt the n addre sse d the
c lai m

by

se arc hi ng

fo r

pare nts' hybri d

"ge nui ne " i nfri nge me nts.148

The

co urt

reco gnize d that pare nts have a il mi te d ri ght to di rec t thei r c hi ldre n's
e duc atio n, but that the ri ght was no t so bro ad as to e nable pare nts to
"co ntro l e ac h and e ve ry aspec to f thei r c hi ldre n's e duc atio n and o ust
the state 's autho ri tyo ve r that subjec t."149 Fi nally, the co urt fo und that
bec ause

the pare nts had no valid ri ght to se nd thei r c hi ld to sc hoo l

141. See, e.g., Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700. One court has also described the colorable
claim approach as requiring a "genuine claim of infringement." Hicks v. Halifa x County Bd.
of Educ., 93 F. Supp 2d 649, 662 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
142. See, e.g. , Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700 ("We note that this case illustrates the difficulty
of applying the Smith exception.").
143. 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
144. Id. at 696. The School had allowed Annie to attend part-time as a seventh grader
but a new superintendent was hired after that year and refused to allow her to resume her
part-time studies as an eighth grader. Id. The reason for the policy change was concern over
the fact that the state did not count part-time students when making funding decisions. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 703.
147. Id. at 698. The court quickly dismissed Annie's claim that the policy was aimed
directly at Annie in an attempt to discriminate against Christian home-schoolers because the
discriminatory aspect of the claim was not raised below at the district court level. Although
one cannot be sure why the Swansons failed to make this argument at the trial level, it was
likely because City of Boerne was decided in between the trial and the appeal. Since they
could have received higher scrutiny under the RFRA, there was presumably no need to
make the discrimination argument. Regardless, the Tenth Circuit insinuated that even if it
were to address the claim, it would have found that the policy did not discriminate on the
basis of religion, but instead on the basis of funding. See id. at 698 n.3.
148. Id. at 699 ("We must examine the claimed infringements on the party's claimed
rights to determine whether either the claimed rights or the claimed infringements are
genuine.").
149. Id.
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the ir c hild' s c lasse s, the y faile d to make

a

c olorable pare ntal rightsc lai m, and the re fore , the c ase di d not pre se nt
a hybrid ri ghts si tuati on.1so
In 1999, the

Ninth Circ uit also e nte re d the

Circ uit's original opinion in

Commission,1s2

Thomas

v.

fray.1s1 The

Ni nth

Anchorage Equal Rights

whic h was late r withdrawn and re ve rse d on othe r

grounds,1s3 is signific ant for two distinc t re asons. Fi rst, the c ourt
offe re d a thorough re vie w of hybrid ri ghts tre atme nt within the othe r
c irc ui ts.1s4 Sec ond, the c ase was fundame ntally di ffe re nt from most of
the typic al hybrid rightsc omplaints this Note hase xamine d thus far in
that i t did not i nvolve

a free e xe rci se c laim in c onjunc tion with a

pare ntal right or free

speec h, but inste ad a free e xe rc ise c laim in

c onjunc tion with a pe r se tak ingsc laim.1ss

Thomas Ii

nvolve d two Alask an landlords who re fuse d to re nt to

unmarrie dc ouple s bec ause the y argue d that doi ng so would fac ilitate
a

si n

and

run

afoul

of

thei r

re ligi ous c onvic ti ons.1s6

disc ri minating against unmarrie d c ouple s, the y would be
both Anc horage

and Alask a' s fair housing laws.1s7 So, the

fi e
l d suit seek ing

a

e nforce me nt of the

dec laratory judgme nt on
statute

the

But

by

violating
landlords

grounds that

against the m would vi olate

the ir free

e xe rc ise of re ligion.1ss
Be fore the Ninth Circ uit state d what standard it would apply to the
hybrid c laim, it surve ye d the alte rnative me thods of othe rc ourts and

1 50. The court reasoned that
The claimed constitutional right Plaintiffs wish to establish in this case is the right of parents
to send their children to public school on a part-time basis, and to pick and choose which
courses their children will take from the public school. . . . However, decisions as to how to
allocate scarce resources, as well as what curriculum to offer or require, are uniquely
committed

to the

discretion

of local

school authorities,

as

the

cases

cited

above

demonstrate . . . . The above discussion establishes that Plaintiffs have shown no colorable
claim of infringement on the constitutional right to direct

a child's education.

Id. at 699-700.
151. The First, Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits had already decided hybrid rights issues.
152. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter Thomas I].
1 53. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
1 54. See Thomas I, 1 65 F.3d at 703-05.
155. Thomas /, 165 F.3d at 707 (stating that Thomas's takings claim was based on his
right to exclude others from his property). The Supreme Court adheres to a per se rule of
compensation for physical takings because landowners are entitled to exclusive possession of
their property . Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
156. Thomas I, 1 65 F.3d at 696.
1 57. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (Michie 2003) (making it unlawful "(1) to refuse to
sell, lease, or rent the real property to a person because of sex, marital status . . . . (2) to
discriminate against a person because of sex, marital status . . . . ).
"

1 58. Thomas /, 195 F.3d at 697.
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the language of Smith159 to de te rmine whe the r a hybrid right ac tually
e xiste d, and if so, what it e ntaile d.160 In seek ing the c orrec t path, the
Ninth Circ uit re lie d he avily on Justice
rights in his

Lukumi c

Soute r' s c ritique

of hybrid

onc urre nce .161 The c ourt agree d with Justice

Soute r that the right c ould not re st on an inde pe nde ntly viable c laim
standard162

or

be

trigge re d e ve ry

time

some

othe r

right

was

implic ate d.163 F or re asons be fore me ntione d, the forme r would re nde r
the F ree Exe rc ise Clause moot and the latte r would swallow the rule
in Smith.164
In an atte mpt to work
dec ide d to use

around the se

two e xtre me s, the c ourt

a "c olorable c laim" standard as a type

of middle

ground.165 U nde r the c ourt' s the ory, the c ompanion c laim must be
c olorable , or "see mingly valid and ge nuine ,"166 me aning that it must
have a fair probability or like lihood of succe ss on the me rits.167 The
Ninth Circ uit dec ide d that this the ory was the most faithful to
Supre me Court language bec ause unde r the me re implic ation the ory,
itse lf would have bee n a hybrid c ase ,168 and unde r the

Smith

inde pe nde ntly viable

right the ory, c ase s suc h as

Yoder

would have

faile d.169 F urthe rmore , the c ourt found the c olorable c laim standard to
be pe rfe c t for the se c once rns bec ause unde r the the ory, Smith' s c laim
would still fail to invoke
would have

a hybrid right while c ase s suc h as

succee de d.11° Applying this Swanson-like

c ourt found that the

Yoder

standard, the

tak ings c laim was c olorable and that a hybrid

159. The Ninth Circuit also described the Supreme Court's guidance on the matter as
"less than precise" and "rather cryptic." Id. at 703.
1 60. Id.
1 61. Id.; see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
162 Id. at 704 ("[T]he Supreme Court's repeated references to the Free Exercise Clause
in the so-called hybrid cases leave us with little doubt that, whatever else it did, the Court
did not rest its decisions in those cases upon the recognition of independently viable free
speech and substantive due process rights.").
163. Id. at 705 ("Government action will almost always 'implicate' a host of
constitutional rights, even though it does not seriously threaten, much less violate, any of
them. Hence, under a permissive 'implication' standard, rarely if ever would a neutral,
generally applicable law be subject to the general rule of Smith.").
1 64. See supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
1 65. Thomas I, 165 F.3d at 705. In doing so, the court recognized that the colorable
claim standard lacked the "exactitude" of the implicated or independently viable approach.
So, it would require courts "to make difficult, qualitative, case-by-case judgments." Id.
1 66. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 449 (1986)).
167. Id. at 707.
168. Id. at 706.
1 69. Id. at 706-07.
170. Id. at 707 ("[A]mong the potential approaches to hybrid rights, only a colorable
claim standard accounts both for Smith (which an implication standard cannot) and for the
original hybrid cases (which an independently-viable-rights standard cannot).").
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right existed.171 Applying stric t sc rutiny, the c ourt further found that
the burden on the landlords was substantial and that the burden was
not j ustified by ac ompelling state interest.172
Although this c olorable c laim standard is the best attempt so far
made byc ourts to legitimately interpret Smith's hybrid exc eption, the
approac h is far from substantively perfec t and also presents
proc edural c hallenges.173 As the

Thomas I c

ourt pointed out, the

approac h requires judges to undertak e diffic ult ad hoc balanc ing in
order to interpret the merit of the c ompanion c laim ac ting in
c onjunc tion with the Free Exerc ise

Clause.174

Furthermore,

the

approac h seemingly treats any c olorable c ompanion c laim the same
and mak es no attempt to explain why the Court singled out c ertain
types of First Amendment and parental rightc laims in

Smith.175

The main problem with thec olorablec laim approac h is that it will
often be impossible to distinguish it from the independently viable
c laim approac h bec ause there is no standard fo r what amounts to a
"genuine " orc olorable c laim. Ac laim is either viable or it is not, but
what is thec orrec t standard for something in between? For example, it
is diffic ult to read Swanson and see how thec olorablec laim approac h
is meaningfully distinguishable from the First Circ uit' s approac h in

Brown.176

The differenc e between an "independently viable" c laim

and a "genuine" c laim might often prove hard to rec ogniz e and it is
easy to see the two seemingly distinc t standards j oining together to
form one blurry, malleable standard. Bec ause of this danger, all of the
problems inherent in the independently viablec laim approac h are also
potentially present in thec olorablec laim approac h.177
There is also a c onc ern that presents itself in the c olorable c laim
approac h that is distinc t from the problems of the independently

171.

Id.

at 708-09.

172. Id. at 714. In a spirited dissent, Judge Hawkins expressed his belief that Smith's
language was dicta best to be ignored and that he would have followed the Sixth Circuit's
lead. Id at 722-24 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's Thomas I
opinion has been withdrawn and the en bane court never reached the issue of the proper role
of hybrid rights in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. It would have been highly instructive
to have the scope of the Smith exception addressed by eleven judges sitting en bane as
opposed to the typical three-judge panel. Nonetheless, Judge O'Scannlain's original opinion
stands out as the most comprehensive judicial review of what exactly the hybrid exception in
Smith actually means and should prove to be instructive to future courts and scholars alike.
173. See Thomas I, 165 F.3d at 705.
174.

Id.

175. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). This
fact could be important because Justice Scalia's opinion plainly states that in Smith the
claimants presented a "free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or
parental right." Id.
176. See generally Swanson v. Gutherie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
177. See supra Section I.C.
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the Court stated that there was no hybri d

Smith,

c lai m presentedi n the c ase bec ause thec lai mant' sf ree exerci se c lai m
was

"unc onnec ted

wi th

any c ommunic ati ve

ac ti vi ty or parental

ri ght."178 Thi s specific language, the sc ope of whic hi s of teni gnored by
c ourts,179 deserves some di sc ussi on.180 Notic e that

Smith

di d not say

that there was no hybri d c lai m bec ause the f ree exerci se c lai m was
unc onnec ted wi th any

constitutional right.

Instead, i t i s lack

of

a

c ommunic ati ve ac ti vi ty or a parental ri ghti nc onjunc ti on wi th thef ree
exerci se c lai m that c auses the c lai mants to f ai l.181 Courts that use a
c olorable c lai m standard do not look

solely f or a c ommunic ati ve

ac ti vi ty or parental ri ghti n exami ni ng the c ompani onc lai m, however,
but are i nstead open to exami ni ng any other c onsti tuti onal ri ght.182
Thi s approac h i s somewhat i nc onsi stent wi th the Supreme Court's
language as well as wi th the c ases the Court ci ted to i llustrate hybri d
ri ghts.183 But if hybri d ri ghts are only to apply to f ree exerci se c lai ms
ac ti ng i n c onjunc ti on wi th c ommunic ati ve ac ti vi ty or parental ri ghts,
the obvi ous questi on that f ollows i s why? What mak es those specific
ri ghts soi ntertwi ned wi th the Free Exerci se Clause that they should be
pri vi leged to some f avored c onsti tuti onal status? P art II of thi s Note
of fers at least a parti al answer to these questi ons.
II.

THE VIGOR OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE ACTING IN
C ONJUNCTION WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS

In order to understand the i mportanc e of parents' ri ght to di rec t
the reli gi ous upbri ngi ng of
tensi on that
educ ati on.

thei r c hi ldren, one must appreci ate the

of ten develops between mi nori ty f ai ths and public

Sc hools, whic h apply fi rm rules and regulati ons, wi ll

i nvari ably c ome i n c onflic t wi th reli gi ous prac tic e, whic h also of ten
requi res stric t adherenc e to ri tual. Sec ti on II.A shows how the nati on's
enduri ng c ommi tment to both public

educ ati on and reli gi on has

resulted i n a c onsti tuti onal juri sprudenc e that mandates speci al
sc ruti ny when those two c ommi tments c olli de. Sec ti on 11.B outli nes
the testc om:ts must use when resolvi ng suc hc onf ilc ts.

178. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
179. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999).
180. This language will be further discussed in this Note in Part II when the proper
scope of hybrid rights is examined.
181. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
182. The potential problem is evident in examining the takings claim in Thomas. See
Thomas I, 165 F.3d at 708-09. This problem does not present itself when the court uses an
independently viable claim approach because the Free Exercise Clause essentially does no
work in those cases. So, the independent claim, if successful, would be successful regardless
of whether or not the free exercise clause was attached.
183. See supra Section I.A.
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Public School Policies Clashing with Free Exercise

The ve ry nature of pare nts' ri ght to di rec t the re il gi ous e duc ati on
of thei r c hi ldre n re qui re s speci al sc ruti ny. Fe w would di spute

that

re il gi ous il be rty184 and ac ommi tme nt to public e duc ati on185 are two of
the most i mportant goals of Ame ric a's de moc rac y. Our de voti on to
e duc ati oni s e vi de nt i n mandatory sc hooli ng laws, but i t i s bec ause of
thi s unwave ri ng de te rmi nati on to e duc ate

Ame ric an c hi ldre n that

re il gi ous value s are at stake . The ulti mate c atc h-22 i s to te ll a pare nt
that ofc ourse he rc hi ld wi ll be e duc ate d, but he r re il gi on must suffe r
at the whi ms of sc hool admi ni strators.186 If a pare nt c annot pay for
pri vate e duc ati on, the
be twee n e duc ati on

gove rnme nt e ffec ti ve ly make s the

and

re il gi on

for

the

pare nt

sc hooli ng laws. Although sc hools typic ally are

vi a

se nsi ti ve

deci si on

mandatory
to re il gi ous

c onvic ti ons, e speci ally maj ori ty re il gi ons, a hybri d ri ght i s e speci ally
i mportant to safe guard mi nori ty re il gi ons. The

nee d for a more

stri nge nt F ree Exe rci se Clause - or at le ast a c lose r e xami nati on by
c ourts of the c onflic ti ngi nte re sts at stake -i se sse nti al whe n mi nori ty
re il gi ous fai ths are thre ate ne d.187
Consi de r the rece nt orde al of Nashala He rn, an e e
l ve n-ye ar-old,
si xth-grade

gi rl i n Oklahoma. Nashala i s Musli m, and he r re il gi on

re qui re s he r to we ar a he adsc arf known as a hi j ab. Ini ti ally, he r sc hool
see me d to have no c omplai nts wi th the hi j ab, but on Se pte mbe r

11,

2003, she was summone d to the pri nci pal' s office and he r pare nts we re
c alle d and told that Nashala must re move

he r he adsc arf.188 He r

pare nts re fuse d and Nashala was suspe nde d.189 The

sc hool di stric t' s

184. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("For religious freedom - the freedom to believe and to practice strange and, it
may be, foreign creeds - has classically been one of the highest values of our society.").
185. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.

Id.
1 86. Cf Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (lamenting that by
denying an exemption from a Sunday closing law to a Jewish business, the Court's decision
"compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic survival.
It is a choice which I think no State can constitutionally demand.").
187. See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1132 (arguing that prior to Smith, the Free
Exercise Clause allowed courts to grant "minority religions the same degree of solicitude
that more mainstream religions are able to attain through the political process.").
1 88. Sheila K. Stogsdill, Scarf causes controversy; Muslim student draws attention to
suspension, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 10, 2003, at 1-A.
189. Nashala was suspended for five more days upon her return to school. Id.
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would not be

allowe d

bac k at sc hool as long as she c ontinue d to we ar the hijab bec ause the
sc hool, in orde r to re duce gang ac tivity, had imple me nte d a ban on
he adwe ar.190 This is the most vulgar of ultimatums-e ithe r yourc hild
c an rece ive

a public e duc ation or she c an c ontinue

to f aithfully

prac tice he r re ligion, but not both. Putting aside anyc once rn that the
sc hool's ac tion against the Muslim girlee rily took place on Se pte mbe r

1 1 , the re are othe r fundame ntal issue s at stake he re .191
f or

Why not fo rce an unwilling sc hool to re asonablye xamine a re que st
a
re ligious
e xe mption
unde r
the
F ree
Exe rc ise

Clause ?192Assumi ng,

arguendo,

that Oklahoma state law pe rmitte d the

sc hool to infringe on Nashala's free e xe rc ise and the sc hool' s ac tions
we re not re ligiously motivate d, he r only imme diate rec ourse was to
sue

unde r fe de ral law. But without a hybrid pare ntal right,

ge ne ral

ruling would

prohibit

applic able law. Plac ing aside
re sult in suc h a misre ading of
illogic al. The

any

re dre ss

from

this

Smith's

ge ne rally

the c onstitutional infirmity that would

Yoder,

this see msc omple te ly

be st solution e
l ave s both the

sc hool's polic y and

Smith

and

Nashala's re ligion c omple te ly intac t - simply rec ognize

that the

polic y re mains in place while simultane ously rec ogniz ing that Nashala
must be give n a re ligiouse xe mption.
In c ase s like Nashala's,193 whe re free e xe rc ise rights are e spec ially
thre ate ne d,

one c an see

the

e nduring nee d f or some

type

of

c onstitutional pare ntal right to dire c t c hildre n's re ligious upbringing.
Toc omple te ly re ad out hybrid rights is to de stroy the e
l gac y of
and

Pierce's c

Yoder

harte r that pare nts have a fundame ntal right unde r the

F ree Exe rc ise Clause of the F irst Ame ndme nt to shape the irc hildre n's
re ligious upbringing.

190. Id.
191. Interestingly, the school's attorney implied that he was ignoring arguments from
the girl's parents that the ban violated the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act because
the Supreme Court in Boerne deemed the applicable portions of the Act unconstitutional.
See id. But that ignores the fact that Oklahoma has its own Religious Freedom Act and
Nashala's case falls directly within the Act's jurisdiction. See 51 OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253
(2002).
192. In Nashala's case, it is obvious that she was not wearing the hijab as part of gang
related activity and absent some other justification, it was unreasonable for the school not to
grant her an exemption.
193. Fortunately for Nashala, the United States Department of Justice intervened in her
father's lawsuit against the Muskogee public school district and the parties settled the case
with the school district agreeing to allow Nashala to wear her hijab until she graduates. The
school district also agreed to establish a process through which students could request
religious exemptions from the dress code. See Press Release, United States Department of
Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement Agreement With Oklahoma School District
in Muslim Student Headscarf Case (May 19, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj .gov/opa/pr/
2004/May/04_crt_343.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
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The Proper Standard for Courts to Use When Addressing
Parents' Hybrid Rights Claims
basic

pre mise

of c irc uit c ourts

that have

acce pte d the

possibility of hybrid rights is that whe n a hybrid right is suffic e
i ntly
e stablishe d, ac ourt must use pre -Smith stric t sc rutiny in rev e
i wing the
c laim.194 The misc once ption of this pre mise arise s from the te rm "stric t
sc rutiny." The

truth is that free e xe rc ise c halle nge s neve r re ally

rece v
i e d stric t sc rutiny,195 insofar as the te rm has bee n unde rstood in
l ast until
e qual protec tion c halle nge s base d on race , whe re - at e
rece ntly - manyc onside re d it stric t in the ory but fatal in fac t.196 The
re al te st was more

ak in to some

type

of inte rme diate

sc rutiny,

re quiring not ac ompe lling gove rnme nt inte re st, but rathe r an inte re st
of the "highe st orde r"197 or a "substantial" gove rnme nt inte re st.198
Othe rc omme ntators have acc urate ly state d that the pre -Smith free
e xe rc ise te st use d by the Court was e sse ntially the same te st use d by
the Court in free speec hc ase s arising unde r
The

O'Brien te

United States

v.

O 'Brien.199

st mandate s that if a ge ne rally applic able law re gulating

c onduc t has an inc ide ntale ffec t on speec h, the gove rnme nt must show
a substantial inte re st that must be balance d against the c halle nge r's
speec h inte re sts to e nsure that the "inc ide ntal re stric tion on alle ge d
First Ame ndme nt free doms is no gre ate r thane sse ntial" to furthe r the

194. See, e.g. , Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998)
(recognizing the argument that a valid hybrid rights claim requires the court to review the
claim under Yoder's standard).
195. See Geoffrey R. Stone, A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent
Developments: Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 985, 994 (1986) ("The Court frequently states that laws having even an
incidental effect on religious activity must pass strict scrutiny. If one looks to the Court's
results rather than to its rhetoric, however, one sees that the actual scrutiny is often far from
strict.").
196. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
("Indeed, the failure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has led some to wonder
whether our review of racial classifications has been strict in theory, but fatal in fact."). In
fact, it is rare for the Court to allow any racial classification to stand when challenged under
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection prong. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 326-27 (2003) ("Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not
all are invalidated by it.").
197. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
198. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
199. See James D. Gordon Ill, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91,
105-06 ("[I)n the free exercise cases the Court has articulated the requisite governmental
interest in various ways. In practice, however, the Court has essentially applied the O'Brien
test."); McConnell, supra note 14, at 1 139 (writing that the O'Brien test is "virtually identical
to the free exercise exemptions test, once it is stripped of overblown language about
'compelling' interests").
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which involved a man who burned

his draft card in protest, demonstrates the explicit need for religious
exemptions in the world of public education, even more so than in
content regulating laws that have incidental affects on speech. After
all, even if O'Brien could not burn his draft card, he had many more
alternative ways to protest the draft. Nashala Hern, however, was
effectively prevented from practicing her religion while simultaneously
receiving a public education unless an exemption was mandated.201
In the context of free exercise exemptions, the equivalent test was
stated in

Braunfeld v. Brown:

if the state enacts a generally applicable

law, "the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden. "202 At first blush this test sounds
quite demanding. But in application, the

Braunfield

Court denied an

exemption from a Sunday closing law to a Jewish merchant because it:
might well undermine the State's goal of providing a day that, as best

possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity. . . .

[And ] enforcement problems would be more difficult since there would

be two or more days to police rather than one and it would be more
difficult to observe whether violations were occurring.203

In practice, this test does not always mandate exemptions, showing
that more rigid free exercise protection does not in fact make each
individual a law unto him or herself.204 Instead, a court must properly
weigh the state's interest, the individual's free exercise interest, and
the means the state uses to advance its interest. Like nearly all the
rights listed in the Bill of Rights, the Free Exercise Clause marks a
"boundary between the powers of the government and the freedom of
individuals," and that boundary is defined and ultimately policed by
the courts.205 B ecause the court - as an arm of the government - is
the ultimate arbiter of what the law is, one can be sure that the
"individual believer is not judge in his own case."206
Furthermore, it is important to understand that the issue is not a
zero-sum game of continued enforcement or granting exemptions.
Instead, a request for a free exercise exemption is more akin to an "as

200. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). In O 'Brien, the Court found
that O'Brien's conviction for burning his draft card could stand because the government met
its burden. Id.
201. See supra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
202. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
203.

Id. at

608.

204. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
205. McConnell, supra note 14, at 1150.
206.

Id.
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applied" constitutional challenge - the general validity of the law is
not challenged, the law is simply challenged as applied to the religious
objector.207 If the exemption is granted, the law remains in force, just
not for the individuals granted religious exemptions.
Also, the interest of the government must be properly narrowed.208
In the context of parental hybrid exceptions, this means that the Court
will not accept a "sweeping claim" that "education is so compelling
that even . . . established religious practices . . . must give way."209
Instead, "[w]here fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake
. . . [the Court] must searchingly examine the interests that the State
seeks to promote . . . and the impediment to those objectives that
would flow" if the State did grant the requested exemption.210 So the
precise government interest to be weighed is the more narrow interest
in not granting the exemption.211 In

Yoder,

for example, after stating

that courts "must move with great circumspection" when balancing a
state's interest with claims for religious exemptions,212 the Court found
that the strong Amish interests at stake entitled the parents to an
exemption because the State failed to show how its "admittedly strong
interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by
granting an exemption to the Amish."213
With this proper understanding of how free exercise exemptions
worked prior to

Smith,

it is far easier to see how courts could

effectively implement the standard in present day hybrid cases. Such
an approach would also be consistent with the two policy evils that

Smith

attempts to curtail. First, as discussed above, each parent would

not be a law unto him- or herself. To the contrary, judges would
simply evaluate parental claims to ensure that they state a sufficient
hybrid right and then decide if the school has a sufficient interest in
not granting the exemption. In the case of Nashala Hern, for example,

207. Id. at 1138 ("[T]he concept of an 'as applied' challenge to a law is a precise
parallel.").
208. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 909-10 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is not the State's broad interest in fighting the critical 'war on
drugs' that must be weighed against respondents' claim, but the State's narrow interest in
refusing to make an exception for the religious, ceremonial use of peyote."). Although
Justice Blackmun dissented in Smith on the grounds of whether pre-Smith scrutiny should
apply, his view of what constituted a state's interest was accurate. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (stating that the interests
advanced by the state must be "properly narrowed").
209. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
210. Id.
211 . As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent in Smith, failure to properly balance
the interest in this way "tends to distort the weighing process in the State's favor." Smith, 494
U.S. at 910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting on other grounds).
212. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
213. Id. at 236 (emphasis added).

Michigan Law Review

2240

[Vol.

1 03:2209

it seems reasonable to suppose that a judge would have found that the
centrality of the headscarf to the Muslim faith is of great significance
- in the words of

Yoder,

central to the religion's "way of life." At the

same time, while the government surely has a substantial interest in
preventing gang violence, it is difficult to claim that it has a substantial
interest in not granting this specific exemption - at least not until a
hijab becomes common gang fashion. This example illustrates how
most exemptions in this context are easily created and administered
while not negatively impacting the substantive polices the school is
attempting to implement.
Of course, this still requires federal j udges to balance the two
interests

- a

process

that

Smith

suggests is

"horrible."214 But

balancing interests is central to the role of judges in a democracy
where individual rights and the public powers of the State often
collide.215 There is no reason to think that judges are somehow less
equipped to undertake this judicial task when the issue at stake is the
free exercise of religion and the adverse parties are a school and
parent. Furthermore, the careful weighing of interests in this context is
exactly what

Yoder endorses and mandates.216
CONCLUSION

The debate over hybrid rights is not yet over.217 Hopefully, the
Supreme Court will revisit its somewhat infamous

Smith

language and

give lower courts further guidance in how to address this difficult

214. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 n 5 . Although per se rules should be deemed favorable to
balancing tests, it seems odd that the Court in this case favored a per se rule against free
exercise considering the plain constitutional text mandates "no law" prohibiting the free
exercise of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
.

215. See David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the
Debate Between Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 829, 838 (1993). Faigman states:

[B]ecause rules are a function of the clash between majoritarian values and individual
liberty, the Court must assume the responsibility for making the difficult choices along the
constitutional frontier. Inevitably, therefore, when the Constitution is implicated, the Court
must weigh the social importance of the government action against the value of individual
liberty infringed by that action.
Id. Balancing is the most common process through which judges solve the "Madisonian
dilemma," which can be understood as the clash between majority and minority tyranny,
where "neither the majority nor the minority can be trusted to define the freedom of the
other." Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 3 (1971).
216. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 ("This should suggest that courts must move with great
circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate
social concern when faced with religious claims for exemption from generally applicable
educational requirements.").
217. This is evident from the wide disparity and confusion of Circuit Courts addressing
the issue.
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question. For the time being, however, federal courts would be wise to
not shrink from Smith's language, but instead wrestle with it and treat
parental free exercise claims with the respect they have been given in
the past century of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The true fear is that minority religions will not receive the same
protections afforded to the more traditional "American" religions.218
The Free Exercise Clause used to act as a judicial checkpoint in this
regard. After

Smith,

many lower courts have acted as if this is no

longer so. But in those special hybrid rights instances, such as the
parental right to direct the religious upbringing of a child, there is still
reason to hope that courts will warm to the idea that it is their
responsibility to fashion a public education system most faithful to the
Constitution - one that recognizes and embraces the pluralistic
society deeply anchored in America's history and tradition.

218. This is most likely because of legislatures' general ignorance to minority faiths, as
opposed to a specific intent to infringe on one's free exercise. The fact that the House voted
unanimously in favor of RFRA and the Senate approved RFRA by a vote of 97-3 reinforces
this point. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994).
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